Legislation
Treaty of Rome
>Art 81
>Art 82
European Convention of Human Rights
Case Law
Joined cases T-213/95
and T-18/96: Stitching Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) and
Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v Commission
[1997] ECR II-01739
C-219/95 P Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission
[1997] ECR I-04411
Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P Commission and another v Ladbroke Racing Ltd.
Cooperatieve Vereniging Suiker Unie v
Commission
[1975] ECR 1663
Case Note: Crane Hire, Wire Netting and Ladbroke Racing
27 Mar 2003
By any standard, the
Enterprise Act 20021 is a substantial piece of legislation. Consisting of
281 sections and 26 schedules, the Act
establishes new competition institutions,
reformulates the law relating to mergers and markets,
criminalizes certain anti-competitive behaviour,
penalizes with disqualification directors of companies engaged in
anti-competitive practices,
extends the collective protection of consumers; and
makes substantial changes to personal and corporate insolvency law.
The Act received royal assent on 7 Nov 2002 and will come into force by
stages over the next financial year.
According to the DTI website2 commencement orders for the competition and
consumer protection
measures will be made during the summer of 2003, commencement orders for the
corporate insolvency
provisions and the abolition of Crown preference early in the coming
financial year, and the personal
insolvency provisions towards the end of that financial year.
Certification
In the Crane Hire Case art 7 of SCK's rules prohibited certified contractors from hiring cranes from companies that they had not certified. As mobile cranes have an operational range of about 30 miles in each direction and contractors have to hire equipment from other companies if they are given work outside the area of operation of their own machines, the practical effect of this restriction was to dampen competition between hire companies. SCK tried to justify the restriction on the grounds that it "simply aimed at fully guaranteeing the quality of certified goods or services." The ECJ rejected that submission on the ground that it was difficult for uncertified contractors to obtain accreditation and the prohibition applied even to contractors who could provide equivalent quality assurance guarantees. The minutes of the meeting at which SCK was formed indicated that the object was to raise prices rather than improve service standards. The question of certification arose again in the context of SCK's application to quash the Commission's refusal to exempt the prohibition on hiring. The Court found that SCK's accreditation added nothing of value to that resulting from the existing system of state regulation making it hard to resist the conclusion that the only purpose of accreditation was to limit the pool of potential contractors.
Publication of
Recommended Rates
The Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven ("the FNK") was
formed in 1971 to defend the interests of crane hire businesses in the
Netherlands. Its members owned just over half of the 3,000 cranes available
for hire in that country. FNK members were encouraged to collaborate with
each other. Art 3 of the association's statutes required its members to give
priority to fellow members when letting equipment out on hire and to charge
each other "reasonable rates". Tariffs for hiring out equipment to other
members were agreed regularly and the association published periodic rate
recommendations and cost estimates. The Commission determined that those
rules infringed art 85 (1) of the Treaty of Rome and fined FNK 11.5 million
ECU. In its application to the ECJ to annul that decision, FNK contended
that the publication of recommended rates was intended to guide negotiations
and that members were not required to charge them and that FNK was not
involved in fixing rates for equipment hire between members. The ECJ
rejected both contentions:
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it reminded itself that art 85 (1) of the Treaty specifically prohibits agreements, decisions or concerted practices "which directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; |
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as there was an obligation to charge reasonable rates it was implicit that those rates would not be less than the rates the members had agreed between themselves for the hire of equipment to each other; |
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FNK had been set up to remedy instability in the market which had forced several companies out of business; |
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although no sanctions had ever been applied on members who charged less than the recommended rates there was at least one instance when a member had been censored for diverging from the recommendation and the setting of rates for equipment hire between FNK members effectively limited the scope for rate competition; and |
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the evidence before the Court was that hire rates between members were set at national and regional FNK meetings and published by FNK staff on FNK stationery. |
ECSC Policy
One of the grounds of appeal in the Wire Netting Case was that the
CFI had taken at face value the Commission's assertion that competition was
still possible despite the regulation of the metal wire market and that it
had not considered whether the impugned agreement or concerted practice
could comply with art 85 in that it tended to stabilize prices for wire
netting and hence metal wire. The applicant submitted that in that respect
the object of the exercise was the same as the Commission's in regulating
the wire market. Rejecting that submission, the Commission held that it was
enough that there was a restriction of competition and it did not lie in the
applicant's mouth to justify an anti-competitive practice on the ground that
it was reinforcing an ECSC policy. Secondly, the applicant argued that a
320,000 ECU fine (that had been imposed on it for participating in a
price-fixing arrangement) should be quashed or reduced because the impugned
agreement or concerted practice was essential for the stabilization of metal
wire prices. It relied on
Suiker Unie v Commission
[1975] ECR 1663 where the ECJ had reduced fines imposed by the
Commission because some kind of common organization of the sugar market was
essential for a minimum price for sugar beet. The ECJ upheld the
decision of the CFI that the two cases were quite different. In Suiker
Unie the relevant market concerned a product that was subject to the
common agricultural policy in the framework of a system of national
production quotas allocated among the main producers. That was not the case
with the market for wire netting which was free and unregulated. Finally,
the applicant argued that its fines should be reduced on the ground that it
was executing Community policy. The ECJ saw no merit in that argument.
Liability for
Anti-Competitive Practices necessitated by National Law
An analogous argument that arose in Ladbroke was whether compliance with
national betting and gaming legislation which might prevent, restrict or
distort competition or abuse a dominant position could infringe art 85 or
86 of the Treaty of Rome. The respondent had complained to the Commission
that an economic interest group consisting of a number of French bookmakers
called the Pari Mutuel Urbain ("PMU") which had been
established and given a monopoly of off-course betting for races in and
outside France under various French enactments infringed Community
competition law. When the Commission decided not to act against PMU
Ladbroke sued the French government for breaching article 90 of the Treaty
of Rome and the Commission for failing to act under art 90 (3). The CFI
quashed the refusal to act on the ground that the Commission could not have
determined whether a case lay against PMU until it had determined whether
the French government was in breach of art 90. Both the Commission and
France appealed against that decision to the ECJ. Allowing the appeal, the
Court held that it was only necessary for the Commission to determine
whether national legislation compelled undertakings to infringe Community
law. An undertaking could not be liable under art 85 or 86 unless it was
capable of independent action. If national law allowed undertakings to
decide whether or not to engage in anti-competitive conduct the Commission
would then consider whether those undertakings had participated in such
conduct.
Important